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Abstract 
How do party cues and policy information affect citizens’ political opinions? In direct 
democratic settings, this question is particularly relevant. Direct democratic 
campaigns are information-rich events which offer citizens the opportunity to learn 
detailed information about a policy. At the same time parties try to influence citizens’ 
decision procedure by publishing their own positions on the issue. The current 
debate on whether ‘party’ or ‘policy’ has more impact on political opinions has not 
yet yielded conclusive results. We examine the effect of policy arguments and party 
cues on vote intention in two Swiss referendum votes using panel survey data. To the 
simple dichotomous question of “party cues or policy information” we add an 
additional twist in asking how party cues affect the processing of policy information 
through processes of motivated reasoning. We find first, that both, policy arguments 
and party cues, have an independent effect on vote intention. However, in a second 
part of the analysis, we find strong evidence for partisan biased processing of policy 
arguments – that is voters tend to align their arguments with their preferred party’s 
position. Our conclusions with regard to the democratic quality of these vote 
decisions are therefore ambivalent. 
                                                          
1 This paper is co-authored with Professor Hanspeter Kriesi 
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Introduction 
How do voters make up their minds in direct democracy? Do they blindly follow party cues, or 
do policy arguments matter in their opinion formation? What role do processes of motivated 
reasoning play in this tension between simplifying the choice by using a partisan cue and making 
the cognitive effort to process detailed policy information? This party-over-policy debate is 
ongoing in political psychology, with some early experiments finding that party cues trump 
policy arguments most of the time, and that individuals follow their party even if they are 
exposed to controversial policy information at the same time (e.g. Cohen 2003). Later research, 
in contrast, has rehabilitated the role of arguments to some extent, showing that individuals are 
very well able to abstract from their preferred party’s position when exposed to substantive 
policy information (e.g. Bullock 2011). Another recent research strand, under the heading of 
motivated reasoning theory, has pointed to the interaction between partisan predispositions 
and information processing and found that very often, our information processing is biased by 
our party preference (e.g. Bartels 2002, Slothuus and de Vreese 2010). The questions we 
address in this paper are therefore: to what extent do citizens rely on policy information versus 
party cues in making their vote decisions? Do party cues substitute for policy-information or do 
they rather interact with policy-related arguments in their effect on vote intentions? To what 
extent do partisan preferences bias information processing during referendum campaigns? In 
direct democratic settings, these questions are particularly relevant, because the legitimacy of 
the decisions depends, among other things, on how people form their opinions. Furthermore, 
direct democracy offers an ideal setting for analyzing party versus policy effects. 
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We test the effect of policy arguments and party cues on vote intentions using original panel 
survey data covering two referendum campaigns in Switzerland. We find, first, that citizens’ 
vote intentions are determined by both, policy arguments and party cues. In a second step our 
study shows, however, that individuals tend to align their position on policy arguments to their 
preferred party’s position over the course of the campaign. Party cues do therefore not 
substitute for policy information – as low information rationality would assume – but they 
trigger partisan biased information processing. With this study, we contribute to research in 
political psychology and public opinion in several ways. First, using panel data, we systematically 
test heuristic effects of party preference versus partisan biased systematic processing in political 
campaigns. Second, in contrast to many previous laboratory experiments, we investigate these 
questions in the real-world context of direct democracy, where citizens are faced with policy 
decisions which affect their life. Finally, we add results from the European context of Swiss 
direct democracy to this discussion which was so far mainly based on data from the United 
States (Bullock 2011). 
 
 
Party over policy? 
Direct democratic campaigns are information-rich events which offer citizens the opportunity to 
learn detailed information about a policy. At the same time parties try to influence citizens’ 
decision procedure by promoting their own positions on the issue. In this context it is 
particularly interesting to know how party cues and policy information affect opinions and vote 
decisions for two reasons.  
5 
 
First,  proponents suggest that direct democratic decisions reflect the will of the people more 
closely than decisions taken in representative systems (Bowler, Donovan, and Tolbert 1998, 
Lupia and Matsusaka 2004). This assumption does not hold, however, if we find that citizens 
rely mainly on party cues when making up their minds. The second reason has to do with the 
debate about citizens’ political ignorance. Critics‘ resistance against direct democratic 
procedures is essentially based on the argument that citizens are not sufficiently qualified to 
participate directly in political decisions because they lack the necessary political knowledge to 
do so (Magleby 1984, Matsusaka 2004, Budge 1996). Public opinion research over the years 
largely tended to confirm the lack of political knowledge of ordinary citizens (Converse 1964, 
Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996, Zaller 1992, Neijens and de Vreese 2009).  
However, the fact that most citizens lack detailed information about politics is not sufficient to 
assume that they are unable to make reasonable political choices. Research under the heading 
of ‘low information rationality’ has shown that citizens who lack detailed policy information can 
use simple heuristic shortcuts, such as following the position of parties or interest groups, in 
order to come to similar conclusions as their well-informed fellow voters (Bowler and Donovan 
1998, Lupia, McCubbins, and Popkin 2000, Lupia and Matsusaka 2004, Kriesi 2005, Sciarini and 
Tresch 2011). This idea of using heuristic cues as decision-shortcuts goes back to so called-dual 
process models of information processing in social psychology (e.g. Chaiken 1980, Petty and 
Cacioppo 1986) and to the work of Kahneman and Tversky (1974) on decision heuristics.  
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Probably the most important heuristic cue in politics is the partisan cue2. Early on in political 
science research, the authors of the American voter have recognized ‘the role of enduring 
partisan commitments in shaping attitudes toward political objects’ (Campbell et al. 1960, 135). 
While in the election context using party cues implies relying on the candidate’s party affiliation 
(Lodge and Hamill 1986, Rahn 1993), in the direct democratic context it means relying on the 
endorsements provided by the party one feels closest to (Kriesi 2005, Boudreau and MacKenzie 
2014, Bowler and Donovan 1998).   
However, even if heuristic cues allow voters to overcome their minimalism to some extent, they 
do not provide a guarantee against unreasonable decision-making. What is probably the most 
worrying downside of the reliance on cues such as party endorsements, is that it allows the 
possibility for the elites to manipulate citizens’ opinions. The concern is that ‘citizens conform 
too readily to the policy views of elites’ (Bullock 2011, 496) and thereby ignore substantive 
information about policies. For the quality of democratic decisions, it is therefore essential that 
citizens do not blindly follow elite cues but that they also consider policy information in making 
their decisions3.  
The discussion about the relative importance of cues versus information is based on the idea of 
dual process models of thinking (e.g. Petty and Cacioppo 1986, Petty and Wegener 1999, 
Chaiken 1980, Kahneman 2011). Dual process models typically distinguish between heuristic 
                                                          
2 A range of other cues and heuristics might possibly play a role in political decisions, such as trust in government, 
status-quo heuristic, or affective and likeability heuristics. 
3 In Swiss direct democracy, parties are not the only elite actors which can provide information or cues, non-
partisan information can come from initiative or referendum committees, civic society organizations or organized 
interest associations. However, as the final decision is always structured as a binary choice, where each side is 
supported by a coalition of actors, and at the same time the major parties issue a vote-recommendation in every 
case, we decided to focus on party cues in this study. Party recommendations also figure much more prominently 
than cues from other organizations among the reasons Swiss voters give for their decisions in post-ballot surveys 
(own calculations, based on Vox data). 
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opinion formation involving low cognitive effort and a systematic, cognitively effortful reasoning 
based on arguments and detailed information. In the present study, following a party cue 
corresponds to a heuristic strategy, while processing policy-arguments corresponds to 
systematic thinking.  
So far, neither experimental, nor observational studies have come to consistent conclusions 
about the relative importance of party cues and policy information in voters’ opinion formation. 
Early studies by Rahn (1993) and Cohen (2003) emphasize the overwhelming influence of party 
cues. More recent experiments conclude that policy information still has strong effects on 
opinion, even when citizens are exposed to party cues (Kriesi 2005, Bullock 2011, Boudreau and 
MacKenzie 2014). These latter authors argue that most of the time people do not have much 
information on, nor interest in specific policies. But in situations where they are provided with 
detailed information and policy-related arguments, people do take these arguments seriously 
and use them to form their opinion.  
Direct democratic votes represent a situation where citizens have incentives to be informed on 
policy (because they can decide) and where there is usually a more or less intensive campaign, 
which provides them with the necessary informationTherefore, the first question we try to 
answer in this paper is: to what extent do citizens rely on policy information versus party cues in 
making their vote decisions? Following recent research results we expect that both, party cues 
and policy information, affect citizens’ vote intention in direct democratic votes (H1). 
 
Deep or shallow? Party cues as heuristics or as triggers of biased systematic processing? 
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Over the last years, research on party cue effects has developed further and the initial 
assumption that party cues simply substitute for detailed policy information has been 
questioned. Several recent contributions show that reliance on party cues does not necessarily 
reduce the amount of policy information voters elaborate or their cognitive effort in processing 
it (Petersen et al. 2013, Leeper and Slothuus 2014, Bullock 2011). Rather, when party cues are 
provided together with policy-information (as is the case in direct democratic campaigns), party 
cues affect the way in which this policy-information is processed. In other words, relying on 
party cues in this situation means that individuals choose the policy information their party 
proposes (Slothuus and de Vreese 2010, Bartels 2002, Gaines et al. 2007, Lenz 2013).  
This research is based on motivated reasoning theory (Taber and Lodge 2006, Lau and Redlawsk 
2006, Kunda 1990). Motivated reasoning describes a process whereby (political) reasoning is not 
necessarily guided by the goal to be accurate (an accuracy goal) – which would correspond to 
the normative ideal - but more often by directional goals, such as a personal motivation to 
protect existing beliefs or to follow a certain party line. Motivated reasoning is different from 
simple cue-taking (e.g. following a party cue to make a political decision) – which is used as a 
shortcut to avoid the effort of processing political information. In the case of motivated 
reasoning, individuals use arguments and information about the issue at stake – but they use it 
to confirm a certain position. Such biased systematic processing is particularly likely under two 
conditions (Chaiken and Maheswaran 1994): when individuals have to deal with highly 
important tasks, and when they face ambiguous information with regard to these tasks. Both 
conditions apply to direct democratic votes, where citizens decide directly about often complex 
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and controversial policy issues which affect their personal life and the welfare of their country 
(Nai 2014). 
The second research question we try to answer in this paper is therefore: Do party cues 
substitute for policy-information or do they rather interact with policy-related arguments in their 
effect on vote intentions? Following motivated reasoning theory, we expect party cues to affect 
citizens’ position on policy-arguments, so that they align their arguments with their party 
preference (H2).  
The question is essential from a normative perspective because the two options entail very 
different consequences and possible remedies (Petersen et al. 2013; Leeper and Slothuus 2014). 
If party cues act as shallow heuristics and substitute for a lack of policy-information, then simply 
providing more detailed information should reduce partisan bias and lead to more considered 
opinions. If, by contrast, party cues activate a directional goal and lead to biased systematic 
processing (Cohen 2003) or partisan motivated reasoning (Taber and Lodge 2006), more 
information will not lead to more balanced opinions. On the contrary, additional information 
will be processed in a partisan biased way and more information will lead to more partisan 
positions (see e.g. Zaller 1992, Taber & Lodge 2006). 
 
       The moderating effect of political knowledge 
Traditionally, dual-process models postulate that the effort individuals decide to put into 
opinion-formation is mostly determined by two factors: their ability and their motivation (see 
e.g. Chaiken 1980, Petty and Cacioppo 1986). Ability, in the political context refers to someone’s 
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political knowledge. There are different ways to conceptualize and measure political knowledge, 
such as for example general vs. issue-specific or long-term/static versus short-term/dynamic 
knowledge (Barabas et al. 2014, Gilens 2001, Shaker 2012). Particularly in the context of direct 
democracy, the claim has been made to use issue-specific knowledge as a measure of ability 
(Kriesi 2005). Motivation, in contrast, can be defined as an individual’s political interest which is 
an indicator for the general willingness to engage in political reasoning and action. Another 
possible indicator for motivation is “need for cognition”, which refers to an individual’s 
“tendency to engage in and enjoy effortful cognitive endeavors” (Cacioppo et al. 1996).  
In this paper, we focus on the effect of political knowledge or ability, which has been debated in 
motivated reasoning theory. Interestingly, some studies have found motivated reasoning and 
belief protection to be just as strong (Bartels 2002, Cohen 2003, Taber, Cann, and Kucsova 2009) 
or even stronger among politically highly knowledgeable individuals than among less 
knowledgeable ones (Meffert et al. 2006, Mutz 2006, Taber and Lodge 2006), while others 
found a reduction of bias among highly knowledgeable (Anduiza, Gallego, and Muñoz 2013, 
Arceneaux 2008, Kam 2005, Boudreau and MacKenzie 2014). On the one hand, the more 
knowledgeable might be better able to understand and integrate policy information and update 
their opinions accordingly. On the other hand, if motivated reasoning holds, they might be more 
skilled in protecting their prior beliefs and to select and process novel information accordingly 
(see Zaller 1992).  
Given these controversial results, we expect citizens with different political knowledge levels to 
use party cues and policy information differently. More specifically, following motivated 
reasoning theory, we expect a stronger partisan bias in information processing for the highly 
11 
 
knowledgeable (H2a). In other words, we expect high knowledge voters to be better able to 
align their policy information with their party preference than low-knowledge voters. 
 
Research Design, Data and Measurement 
Data  
Our analysis is based on individual-level panel survey data collected for two national-level 
popular votes in Switzerland. The issues at stake were first, a familiar, salient, and easily 
understandable asylum law revision and, second, a technical, highly complex and unfamiliar 
corporate tax reform4. The surveys were designed by researchers at a Swiss University and 
conducted by a Swiss polling agency through computer-aided telephone-interviewing. The 
population consisted of Swiss citizens from 18 years on (voting-age) who live either in the 
German- or French-speaking part of Switzerland and speak one of the two languages sufficiently 
well5. The sample was drawn through a random-quota sampling strategy where the households 
were selected randomly, while the target person within a household was selected according to 
quota-criteria. These criteria were gender, age, education, and occupation. The sample is 
therefore representative of the Swiss population in these relevant variables.  
The panels consisted of two waves. The first wave was conducted at the beginning of the 3-
month referendum campaigns, the second wave immediately after the two votes respectively. 
Thus we have before- and after-campaign measures for both cases. We only include 
                                                          
4 A detailed description of the two cases can be found in the online appendix 
5 The Italian-speaking part was left out of the analysis for cost reasons 
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respondents who have answered both waves in the analysis, which means that the dataset is 
balanced. For our models, we are left with 1092 (asylum) and 1001 (corporate tax) respondents 
respectively. Every respondent constitutes an observation for each panel wave in which she 
participated, which means that every respondent contributes two observations. Descriptive 
statistics of the variables used can be found in the Tables A1 and A2 in the online appendix. 
 
Key concepts / Operationalisation 
Vote intention  
Our first outcome measure is the vote intention for both waves. For the first wave, the specific 
questionnaire item reads as follows: ‘If there were a ballot tomorrow, would you strongly be in 
favour, rather in favour, rather against or strongly against [the proposal, e.g. the toughening of 
the asylum law]?’ In the second wave, after the vote, we repeated a question similar to the vote 
intention question, which will be used here: ‘Are you strongly in favour, rather in favour, rather 
against or strongly against [the proposal, e.g. the toughening of the asylum law]?’ The variable is 
dichotomized by median-split, in order to distinguish between supporters and opponents of the 
proposition. We prefer the vote intention over the final choice in the second wave, because it 
allows us to include the respondents who have not participated in the vote 6.  
 
Party preference 
                                                          
6 The results remain virtually identical when actual voting behavior reported in the second wave is used as the 
dependent variable. 
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Following previous studies (Slothuus and de Vreese 2010, Van der Eijk et al. 2006), we 
operationalize partisan preferences on the basis of a set of questions asking the respondents to 
indicate how likely it is that they will ever vote for each one of the four major Swiss parties – the 
Social Democrats (SPS), Christian-Democrats (CVP), the Liberals (FDP or LPS) and the Swiss 
People’s Party (SVP) –, as well as for the Green party (GPS). These questions have been asked 
only once, at the beginning of the campaign, since we assume that voters do not change their 
partisan orientation during a short issue-specific campaign. 
The responses range from ‘will never vote for this party’ (score 0) to ‘will certainly vote for this 
party at some time in the future’ (score 10). Based on this information, we define a 
respondent’s partisan predisposition with respect to a given proposal as the difference between 
his or her greatest likelihood to vote for a party in the alliance supporting the proposal, and his 
or her greatest likelihood to vote for a party in the alliance opposing the proposal. Respondents 
with clear cut partisan allegiances will get high (negative or positive) values on this indicator, 
while respondents with weak or ambivalent allegiances will get values close to zero. In order to 
make our two independent variables, party preference and policy arguments, more 
comparable, we standardize them with a mean of 0 and a standard deviation of 1. Only 3.4 
percent of the respondents in the sample do not have a value on this indicator of partisan 
predispositions.  
 
Party cue knowledge 
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We can only assume that party preference affects vote intention through the use of a partisan 
heuristic if an individual actually knows her preferred party’s position. Therefore, we introduce 
an additional, dichotomous variable which takes 0 for respondents who do not know their 
preferred party’s position on the proposition and 1 for those who know it. Only the latter are 
able to use party cues. 
 
Policy arguments 
For each one of the two proposals, the interviews included a list of arguments7 related to the 
ballot proposition in both waves. At the beginning and at the end of the campaign, the 
respondents were asked how much they agreed with these arguments: ‘We would now like to 
ask you about your personal opinion about various positions. Please, tell me from 1 ‘do not 
agree at all’ to 5 ‘fully agree’, how much you agree with these positions’. Thus for each 
argument, respondents received a score from 1 to 5. The list of arguments included the key 
arguments of the pro- and the contra-camp as well as some secondary arguments which had 
also been used during the campaign.  
We created a single additive index of respondents’ argument position in the following way: 
First, we build the sum of the pro-argument scores and the con-argument-scores separately. 
Second, we subtract the sum of the contra-scores from the sum of the pro-scores. Positive 
values on this index signify support for the proposition while negative values represent 
opposition to it: the stronger (positive/negative) the value, the stronger the argument position. 
Again, we standardize this indicator with a mean of 0 and a standard deviation of 1. This 
                                                          
7 The online appendix shows the key arguments of each campaign 
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approach to measuring policy arguments is in line with previous Swiss research on the effect of 
arguments and on correct voting (Kriesi 2005, Nai 2015, Lanz and Nai 2015, Milic 2012). 
In addition to these main variables of the analysis, we included a set of standard control 
variables which includes gender, age, education level (below secondary vs. secondary/tertiary 
education), and political knowledge. Political knowledge was measured as issue-specific 
knowledge, by asking respondents 3 questions on the content of the propositions. From these 
three questions we build a simple additive index which ranges from 0 (no knowledge) to 3 (full 
knowledge). The three questions were included in both waves. For the analysis we use the 
respondents’ average value, assuming this to be an appropriate indicator of the overall level of 
knowledge of respondents on the proposals8. 
 
Empirical Results 
The analysis proceeds in two parts. First, we estimate the effect of party cues and policy 
arguments on vote intention during the referendum campaigns. In a second step we estimate 
the effect of party preference on policy arguments to test the partisan biased processing 
hypothesis. All effects are estimated separately for the two cases. 
 
Results - part one:  Direct effects of party preference and policy arguments on vote intention 
and campaign effects 
                                                          
8 As table A3 in the online appendix shows, low knowledge scores decreased while high knowledge scores 
increased from t1 to t2, which indicates learning effects during the campaign.  
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Table 1 presents the coefficients (with standard errors in parentheses) of a random-intercept 
logit regression9 with vote intention (support vs. opposition of the proposition) as outcome 
variable. We use a random-intercept model because this allows us to account for the panel 
structure of the data and at the same time to estimate the effect of party preference, which 
does not vary over time. 
Models 1 (for both cases) show the effect of policy arguments only, holding control variables 
constant, while in models 2, we add party preference. The first two rows show the coefficients 
for the effect of party preference and policy arguments on vote intention The two subsequent 
rows show interaction effects for the same variables at t2, which is right after the vote. The 
remaining rows present the coefficients for the control variables as well as the t2-constitutive 
term. To test whether the effect of party preference is really due to the use of party cues we 
need to compare this effect for respondents who know their party’s cue and those who do not. 
For this purpose, we calculate the full models separately for respondents with and without 
knowledge of their party’s position. Models 3 present the results for respondents without 
knowledge of their preferred party’s cue10. As table A2 in the appendix shows, by the end of the 
                                                          
9 A Hausman test (Prob>chi2  = 0.136) shows that the coefficients of our random-effects model are not 
systematically different from those of a fixed-effects model  (for the time-varying covariates). Possible bias 
introduced through omitted individual-level time-invariant characteristic is thus negligible and the use of random 
effects model is appropriate. 
10 Table A4 in the appendix presents the full models including an interaction effect between party orientation and 
party cue knowledge as an alternative way to display the moderating effect of cue knowledge. In both cases, the 
interaction effect between party orientation and party cue knowledge is statistically significant and positive. This 
means that the effect of party orientation on vote intention is significantly stronger for respondents who know 
their party’s position (marginal effect 0.17, p< 0.001) than for those who don’t (marginal effect 0.06, n.s.). This 
underlines the robustness of the results presented in table 1. 
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campaign, a large majority of respondents know their preferred party’s position (78.34% in the 
asylum law case and 75.64 in the corporate tax case11).  
First, in models 1, we can see that at the outset of the campaign (t1) policy arguments have a 
strong and statistically significant effect on vote intention. This effect diminishes only slightly 
once we introduce party cues in models 2. Thus both, party preference as well as policy 
information have an, positive, and statistically significant effect on vote intention, holding all 
other variables constant. As expected however, the effect of party preference is substantively 
stronger and statistically significant only for the respondents who know the party cue (models 
3), which indicates that party preferences affect vote intention through the use of party cues. 
Our first hypothesis is thus confirmed (H1). This is true for both issues, the asylum law reform 
and the corporate tax reform. In other words, respondents’ vote intention is significantly 
associated with their party preference (provided they know the cue), as well as with their 
position on policy arguments. Interestingly, the effect of argument position is also markedly 
stronger for respondents who know the party cue as compared to those who don’t know it. This 
result is very much in line with the argument we develop in the second part of the paper – it is 
likely that citizens tend to adjust their argument position to their party preference.  
Furthermore, as rows three and four show, the campaign has a significant reinforcing effect on 
party preference and policy information in the simple case of the asylum law. This means that 
the association between the respondents’ party preference and their vote intention, as well as 
the association between their policy position and their vote intention was strengthened during 
                                                          
11 Furthermore, the participation rate is higher among respondents who know the party cue than among 
respondents who don’t know it (table A5 in the online appendix). This correlation is stronger in the complex 
corporate tax case. This suggest that party cues might facilitate participation in referendum votes.  
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the campaign. In contrast, for the complex case of corporate tax reform, only the argument 
effect was (statistically) significantly strengthened during the campaign. 
 
<Table 1 about here> 
 
 
In order to better understand the substantive effects of our main explanatory variables, table 2 
presents the marginal effects of party preference and policy arguments on vote intention for 
the full models, and for respondents who know their party’s cue – so table 2 corresponds to 
models 2 in table 1. The marginal effects correspond to the increase in the probability to vote 
yes for a given proposition which is associated with a one standard deviation increase in the 
explanatory variable. The table shows the initial effects at t1, the additional campaign effects at 
t2, as well as the total effects (in bold).  
First of all, the association between vote intention and policy arguments is substantively very 
strong. At t1, the probability of voting yes increases by 40.5 (asylum law) or 41.2 (corporate tax) 
percent for one standard deviation change in the pro-direction of the policy argument scale. For 
party preference by contrast, the probability of voting yes increases by 7.6 or 16.3 percent 
respectively for one standard deviation change towards the right. At the end of the campaign, 
the corresponding marginal effects amount to 24.0 or 14.8 percent for party preference, and to 
as much as 70.4 or 54.4 percent for policy arguments. These percentages are not directly 
comparable as the two measures represent substantively different concepts, but we can see 
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that the effect of arguments remains substantial, even if we control for party cues. Comparing 
the two cases, party cues have, a stronger initial effect in the complex corporate tax 
referendum. By contrast, the initial effect of arguments does not differ between the two cases.  
 
<Table 2 about here> 
 
To sum up this first part of the analysis, party cues do not substitute for policy information, 
arguments have an independent effect on vote intention, even if we control for the 
respondents’ party preferences. The effects of the campaign are stronger in the easy, asylum 
case. 
 
 
Results - part two:  Does party preference affect position on policy arguments? 
Table 3 presents the results of lagged regression models. In order to test our biased processing 
hypothesis, following Bartels (2002), we regressed argument position at t2 on lagged argument 
position at t1 (at the outset of the campaign), party preference, a constant term, as well as a set 
of controls. We present this analysis only for the respondents who know the party cue. The 
coefficient of interest for us is shown in row 2: the effect of party preference on argument 
position after the vote, when controlling for the initial argument position. The columns present 
the results for all subjects as well as separately for low- and high-knowledge subjects. 
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Looking at all subjects first, we clearly see our second hypothesis (H2) on partisan biased 
processing confirmed for both cases. Party preference has a statistically significant effect on 
argument position after the vote, even if we control for respondents’ initial argument position. 
Not surprisingly, lagged argument position is the strongest determinant of argument position at 
t2, but at the same time party preference still exhibits a significant effect on argument position 
during the campaign. As party preference does not change over time, this means that 
respondents align their argument position with their party preference in the course of the 
campaign12.  
Substantively, among all subjects, the maximum amount of change in t2-argument position 
associated with a change from the radical right pole of the party spectrum to the radical left, 
when controlling for initial argument position, is 0.68 or approximately 12% of the argument-
scale for the asylum law, and 1.1 or approximately 19% of the argument-scale for the corporate 
tax case. These effects are also substantively meaningful.  
 
<Table 3 about here> 
 
Comparing once more the two cases, this biased processing effect seems to be stronger for the 
more complex corporate tax referendum. In the easy case, t2 argument position is more 
strongly determined by t1 argument position. However, as to our hypothesis H2a on biased 
                                                          
12 Table A6 in the appendix underlines these results: it presents the effect of party orientation on vote intention, 
excluding argument position. When not controlling for argument position, the effect of party orientation is 
substantially stronger. This indicates that a part of the effect of party orientation on vote intention acts through 
arguments position, as a mediator variable.  
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processing for different political knowledge levels, the results are mixed. In the easy asylum law 
case, the biased processing effects are stronger for the highly knowledgeable than for the less 
knowledgeable respondents. Thus highly politically knowledgeable individuals display a stronger 
partisan bias in information processing than less well-informed ones. This is not true for the 
corporate tax case, however, where both, the well and the little informed respondents exhibit 
comparable biased processing effects.  
To sum up this second part, party cues interact with arguments in the course of the campaign, 
they shape the way subjects change their position on arguments during the campaign. In other 
words: the change in argument position during the campaign is strongly associated with 
respondents’ party preference.  
 
 
Discussion 
First, we find that vote intention is associated with both, party cues and policy information at 
the same time. Thus the idea that voters are either well-informed about the policy details or, if 
not, they resort to party cues as a simple heuristic shortcut does not seem to hold. Saying that, 
in direct democracy, ‘people base most of their choices, even complex and important ones, on 
very simple kinds of information […] rules of thumb or heuristics’ because they lack the 
cognitive capacity to ‘know detailed information, or conduct rigorous research, on the 
consequences of every choice they face’ (Lupia and Matsusaka 2004, 468) does not tell the 
whole story.  
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Rather, in line with democratic norms, voters hold meaningful opinions, which are based at 
least to some extent on substantive policy arguments. Not only do policy arguments in our 
study have a statistically significant effect on vote intentions even which holds up even when 
controlling for party position, they are also substantively more strongly associated with vote 
intentions than party cues. This finding is well in line with some recent experimental findings, 
questioning the radical ‘party-over-policy-hypotheses’ (Cohen 2003) and finding policy 
information to be relevant, even if party cues are present (Bullock 2011, Boudreau and 
McKenzie 2014).  
While party preference does not vary, vote intention and argument position vary over the 
campaign. With the present data we cannot exclude reverse causation effects of vote intentions 
on argument positions and this is probably the main limitation of our study. In comparison to 
previous experimental studies on the party-over-policy question we do not directly expose 
respondents to new information and therefore cannot observe their direct reaction to this 
information. In other words, we do not know whether respondents adapt their vote intention to 
their argument position or the other way around – but, that said, we think that the association 
between these two variables and its change throughout the campaign is already a very 
interesting finding, which lines up well with other studies that use experimental methods to 
better determine the direction of causality. The question of causality between vote intentions 
and argument positions is at the heart of recent studies on correct voting in Swiss direct 
democracy (see Nai 2015, Lanz and Nai 2015, Milic 2012).  
Despite these optimistic findings showing that policy information is relevant, the processing of 
this policy information is found to be strongly affected by party preference. We find a clear 
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partisan biased processing effect, meaning that voters tend to align their position on 
substantive policy arguments with their party preference during the campaign if they know their 
party’s position on the issue. This also means that party preference influences vote intention 
not only directly through the use of party cues, but also indirectly, through the biased 
processing of arguments. The fact that, by the end of the campaign, more than 75% of the 
voters know their preferred party’s position lends additional strength to this point and indicates 
that these partisan biased processing effects are pervasive13. With regard to political knowledge 
levels our results are mixed. In the easy case of the asylum law reform, we found the biased 
processing effect to be stronger among highly knowledgeable citizens. When it is relatively easy 
to gather information, well-informed citizens are apparently better able to align their arguments 
with their preferred party’s position. In the more complex corporate tax case in contrast, biased 
processing did not differ between the well- and the poorly informed. In this case, where people 
generally have a hard time understanding the facts, everyone appears to rely strongly on party 
positions for their interpretation of the policy-arguments. These mixed results might also be due 
in part to our rather crude measure of political knowledge though.  
These findings are in line with motivated reasoning theory, which assumes all political thinking 
to be directional and goal-oriented. Recently, Bolsen et al. (2014, 245) have defined directional 
reasoning as “the default method to forming evaluations in political contexts”. Our study 
contributes an additional piece of evidence to this research. Furthermore, it is also in line with 
                                                          
13 Another possible limitation we would like to point out here however, is that the results of the referendums 
themselves may affect the partisan bias. As our dependent variable argument position at t2 is measured after the 
outcome of the referendum is known, we cannot exclude that the fact of being a winner or a looser of the 
referendum affects the  estimated partisan bias. This is in itself an interesting question, which goes beyond the 
scope of this paper however. 
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the early insight of the authors of the American voter (Campbell et al. 1960) that partisan 
preferences are crucial social ties which shape our attitudes towards political objects, and they 
support Bartels’ (2003, 117) conclusion that ‘party identification is a pervasive and dynamic 
force shaping citizens’ perceptions of, and reactions to, the political world’.  
To some extent, this second finding of our study qualifies the optimistic first conclusions drawn 
above. If voters process information in a biased way, preferring information which conforms to 
their party preference, and disregarding or devaluating incompatible information at the same 
time, this is problematic from a democratic point of view. Such a process clearly does not 
correspond to the ideal of deliberative debate, where citizens listen to both sides and base their 
decisions on the force of the better argument.  
Not only does partisan motivated reasoning hinder deliberative debate, it is also difficult to 
remedy. If citizens are incompetent because they lack information and arguments about specific 
policies, the most obvious answer is to provide them with more and better information; or at 
least to provide them with suitable elite cues which allow them to reach reasonable 
conclusions. If, however, the problem lies in the partisan processing of information, these 
strategies will hardly help. Here it is important to remember however, that party cues might 
have a positive effect as learning aids, facilitating participation for citizens. The fact that 
participation rates are higher among respondents who know the cues hint in this direction.  
Conclusion 
As our study and other recent findings suggest, it is not either party or policy, but most probably 
party cues and policy information which affect opinions. In consequence, it is not true, as has 
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often been suggested, that citizens ignore policy information once they are exposed to party 
cues (Cohen 2003, Rahn 1993, Zaller 1992, Popkin 1991). The present study provides further 
evidence for the claim that having arguments and policy-related information, is in fact 
important for individuals. Thus voters do not simply copy and paste their party’s position onto 
their ballot paper, but rather base their position to a great extent on substantive policy 
arguments. At the same time, we find however, that policy arguments are processed to be in 
line with partisan orientation. This latter finding somewhat relativizes the optimistic conclusion 
that arguments play a central role in decision making.   
The idea of party cues as shortcuts and substitutes for policy information, as one of the most 
important ideas in political psychology of the recent decades, needs to be revisited. Our result, 
in line with other recent studies, suggests that this is not the only mechanism through which 
party cues work. Cues do not necessarily reduce the elaboration of policy arguments, the two 
types of information act in parallel, at the same time, and indeed they interact with each other. 
In other words, party orientation affects vote intention directly, through cue taking, as well as 
indirectly, through motivated reasoning processes. 
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Table 1: Regression of party preference and policy arguments on vote intention, including controls 
Note. Logit coefficients and standard errors in parentheses; dependent variable: vote intention dichotomized;   * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001. Cue know refers to 
whether respondents know their preferred party’s position on the issue. 
 ASYLUM LAW REFORM CORPORATE TAX REFORM 
model 1 
 
argument only  
cue know=1 
2 
 
full model  
cue know=1 
3 
 
full model  
cue know=0 
1 
 
argument only  
cue know=1 
2 
 
full model   
cue know=1 
3 
 
full model  
cue know=0 
party orientation  0.355 0.216  0.730 0.078 
  (0.159)* (0.133)  (0.169)*** (0.135) 
argument position 2.158 1.888 0.815 2.129 1.851 0.819 
 (0.285)*** (0.280)*** (0.179)*** (0.256)*** (0.244)*** (0.186)*** 
t2*party orient.  0.646 -0.019  -0.067 0.272 
  (0.244)** (0.291)  (0.203) (0.235) 
t2*argument pos. 1.587 1.392 1.273 0.658 0.593 0.186 
 (0.343)*** (0.345)*** (0.378)*** (0.277)* (0.279)* (0.270) 
t2 1.452 1.432 0.960 0.580 0.567 0.657 
 (0.277)*** (0.277)*** (0.282)*** (0.221)** (0.219)** (0.235)** 
gender 0.642 0.576 0.065 -0.352 -0.153 -0.124 
 (0.236)** (0.230)* (0.210) (0.235) (0.227) (0.216) 
age 0.006 0.000 0.008 0.143 0.043 -0.061 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.083) (0.081) (0.070) 
education -0.683 -0.683 -0.252 -0.038 -0.015 0.539 
 (0.406) (0.395) (0.330) (0.412) (0.395) (0.322) 
political knowledge -0.174 -0.129 -0.061 0.033 0.060 0.234 
 (0.120) (0.117) (0.106) (0.125) (0.123) (0.121) 
_cons 0.545 0.789 0.110 -0.292 -0.041 -0.647 
 (0.554) (0.548) (0.457) (0.597) (0.574) (0.479) 
lnsig2u 0.337 0.056 -2.316 0.962 0.754 -1.041 
 (0.631) (0.768) (6.063) (0.393) (0.443) (1.504) 
sigma_u 1.184 1.029 0.314 1.618 1.458 0.594 
 (0.374) (0.395) (0.952) (0.318) (0.323) (0.447) 
rho 0.299 0.243 0.029 0.443 0.392 0.097 
 (0.133) (0.141) (0.171) (0.097) (0.106) (0.132) 
N 1,126 1,126 536 1,151     1,151     533 
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Table 2: Marginal effects of party preference and policy arguments on vote intention 
  ASYLUM LAW CORPORATE TAX 
   total effects  total effects 
Party preference t1   0.076    0.163   
  (0.035)  (0.038)  
 t2 +0.164  = 0.240 -0.015  = 0.148 
  (0.061)  (0.046)  
Policy arguments t1   0.405    0.412  
  (0.058)  (0.052)  
 t2 +0.290 = 0.704 +0.132  = 0.544 
  (0.071)  (0.062)  
Notes. The table presents results for the full model and for respondents with party cue 
knowledge, corresponding to models 2 and 5 in table 1. Marginal effects (and standard 
errors in parentheses) are calculated under the assumption that random effects = 0. The 
numbers represent the increase in probability to vote yes for a given proposition associated 
with one standard deviation increase in the explanatory variable. Total effects over both 
t1&t2 are shown in bold. 
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Table 3: Regression of lagged argument position (at t1) and party preference on argument position at t2.  
 
Note. OLS coefficients and standard errors in parentheses; dependent variable: argument position at t2; * 
p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001. Only respondents with knowledge of party position are included in the 
analysis.  
 ASYLUM LAW CORPORATE TAX 
 all 
subjects 
low 
knowledge 
high 
knowledge 
all 
subjects 
low 
knowledge 
high 
knowledge 
Lagged argument 
position 
0.793 0.664 0.812 0.564 0.509 0.590 
 (0.026)*** (0.066)*** (0.027)*** (0.031)*** (0.049)*** (0.041)*** 
party preference 0.146 0.090 0.156 0.287 0.308 0.274 
 (0.024)*** (0.057) (0.026)*** (0.031)*** (0.045)*** (0.042)*** 
gender 0.093 0.011 0.094 -0.146 -0.209 -0.087 
 (0.043)* (0.100) (0.048)* (0.061)* (0.089)* (0.084) 
age 0.000 -0.004 0.001 -0.060 -0.075 -0.059 
 (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.021)** (0.032)* (0.028)* 
education -0.106 0.035 -0.178 -0.102 -0.178 -0.052 
 (0.071) (0.142) (0.082)* (0.108) (0.160) (0.145) 
_cons -0.022 0.197 0.003 0.505 0.597 0.474 
 (0.097) (0.223) (0.109) (0.146)*** (0.221)** (0.195)* 
R2 0.74 0.56 0.77 0.50 0.48 0.51 
N 651 132 519 652 267 385 
